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The University of Chicago
Rose & Milton Friedman
A Celebration
June 18, 1998,
San Francisco, California
excerpt by George Shultz |
What a great pleasure it is to be here and
to be part of this ceremony and event. Rose and Milton, you are great
people, and I have benefited so much from my association with you.
As I’ve traveled around the world and met with various leaders
like Gorbachev, Nakasone, and so on, I’ve often been asked,
“Who do you think has had the most impact on the world?"
The answer is very clear to me: Milton Friedman. And the reason is
very simple: it’s Milton’s ideas, his readiness to argue
for those ideas and to support those ideas with evidence that, when
they are put to use, they work. Hugo, you were talking about the University
of Chicago’s tradition of disagreeing and it made me think of
the statement that you hear economists make once in a while to the
effect that, "Everyone loves to argue with Milton, particularly
when he isn’t there.” Milton is formidable in debate,
but the real point is that he has set so much of the agenda.
Rose and Milton, I’m reading your book, page by page, and it’s
wonderful. I noticed in one of the passages you mention that your
collaboration has been focused on public policy issues as distinct
from some other things that Milton has worked on. So I want to talk
about public policy issues and the way that your ideas have influenced
my thinking and my life.
I came to the University of Chicago from the Department of Economics
at MIT, and I found myself in a totally different intellectual environment.
The Department of Economics at Chicago had—and I suspect still
has—a mystique about it, a way of propelling you into a discussion
of ideas, and getting you to argue, to listen, and to learn. At the
University of Chicago, everybody is a student and we all learned from
each other. And I learned a lot from the people there in that special
environment. I was lucky to have George Stigler across the hall from
my office and I could hear him all the time. But it was Milton’s
pervasive influence that got into my thinking even as a labor economist
and an industrial relations specialist.
As you may recall, there were lots of strikes during the 1960s. As
a labor economist I worried about the strikes and the pattern of intervention
that was so prevalent during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
I was getting more and more under Milton’s spell and found myself
thinking, “When the government intervenes, it changes the game.”
Of course, there was always a justification for the intervention.
Most often it was because the government believed that the marketplace
couldn’t possibly handle the problems resulting from the strikes,
so the government had to intervene. I started writing articles and
giving talks in which I went on record stating that intervention was
usually not a good idea.
Then, suddenly, I was Secretary of Labor. There was a strike in progress.
The East Coast longshoremen had struck. It starred the previous October.
President Johnson had declared the strike a national emergency. That
was challenged, but the Supreme Court agreed with him. The Taft—Hartley
injunction ran for something like eighty or ninety days. But the strike
started up again just as I came into office. The statutory procedures
available had run out, and anyway I was on record as being against
intervention. The reporters were asking, “Okay, Mr. Secretary
of labor, what are you going to do now?”
Buoyed by my Chicago learning experience, I gathered up my courage
and went to President Nixon and said, “Mr. President, your predecessor
was wrong, and the Supreme Court was wrong. This will not constitute
a national emergency. Markets are more clever than people think. There
will be disruptions, but markets will find ways of getting around
what these people are monopolizing, and pretty soon that will cause
them to settle the dispute. If we can manage that, we’ll get
management and labor to take responsibility once again for what they’re
doing.” Well, he bought that argument, and it worked! So I knew
that Milton had taught me a valuable lesson: the marketplace works.
Next, I was appointed Director of the Budget. And much to my surprise,
I soon found myself in an argument with Arthur Burns about a financial
matter. The Penn Central was about to go bankrupt, and Arthur—and
it seemed everyone else—wanted to intervene by bailing them
out. I starting arguing “Oh, Arthur, it's not going to he as
hard on financial markets as you think. It will set a bad precedent
if we intervene,” and all that kind of stuff; you know, all
the kind of stuff we talk about at the University of Chicago. (Me,
argue with Arthur Burns? He was Milton’s teacher!)
Well, I’ll never know how President Nixon would have come out
on the matter because at that moment a wonderful guy, Bryce Harlow,
walked in. Bryce was the Congressional Relations political advisor,
and he said, “Mr. President, in their wisdom, the Penn Central
has just hired your old law firm to represent them. And under the
circumstances, you can’t touch this with a ten foot pole.”
So the Penn Central went bankrupt and guess what? No dominoes fell.
The market absorbed it. The market was able to distinguish between
a lousy job and a good job. And it worked.
We had a similar situation not long ago in Orange County in California.
Orange County was on the verge of going bankrupt and people said the
whole system of municipal finance would go down if Orange County were
allowed to fail. Well, guess what? Orange County declared bankruptcy
and it actually served to strengthen the system of municipal finance.
It caused people to think more carefully, to be more responsible because
they realized they would be held accountable.
Milton’s ideas, his way of thinking about things, really made
a big impression on me—because they work. So much of it is about
freedom, about having confidence that freedom will work, that the
market will work, that if you give people the chance to follow their
interests in a reasonably competitive, decent environment, that will
work. Sometimes it’s hard to convince people who say, “You’re
rolling the dice if you don’t intervene.” But I say, “You’re
rolling the dice if you do intervene, because you’re going to
create something very different.” And right now we have a pattern
of intervention in the Asian markets and some others that’s
changing the game in a very adverse way. So once again, with Milton’s
encouragement, we’re fighting the same old battle, but in new
locations.
I noticed a picture of the founding of the Mont Pelerin Society as
I arrived this evening, and I also noticed that a lot of people are
wearing Adam Smith ties and Invisible Hand Society ties. The founding
of that society was a very important event, but the fight for freedom
is never ending—it’s a problem that never gets solved.
And it’s happening on an international scale right now because
people keep saying, “The market won’t work. The government
has to do something.”
Rose and Milton, you’ve taught us to respect the market and
to have confidence in freedom. And as my case studies illustrate,
whenever we do, we see how justified those views. You’ve also
taught us the truth of the saying that “the price of freedom
is eternal vigilance,” and that we have to keep fighting for
it all the time. And in my view, you “two lucky people”
are the premier fighters. Thank you for writing this wonderful book
and for all your other books that have been—and continue to
be—so very, very influential. Personally, I feel so much in
your debt for all the sense you’ve pounded into my head, and
for all your friendship and love. I love you too. Thank you.
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